They Should Have Locked Him Up! Defendant’s Destruction of Barley Crop Killed Thousands of Potential Beers

In June 2001 Richard D. Crowder, II borrowed his brother’s new pickup truck to drive to a party in Augusta County. After apparently imbibing a few beers, Mr. Crowder took a friend on a joyride and proceeded to drive off-road through a field of barley, spinning a number of “doughnuts” in the crop.

Unfortunately for Mr. Crowder, the son of the barley’s owner saw his transgression and reported the truck’s license plate to the police. The constable arrested Mr. Crowder for felony destruction of property valued in excess of $1,000, contra Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-137.

At trial, the prosecutor asked the barley’s owner a leading question stating that the value of the destroyed crops was $2,000, but the defendant’s attorney objected. The prosecutor then noted that the indictment was for destruction of property valued at $2,000 and asked the owner how he had come up with the figure. The owner testified that he and three other farmers had gotten together to estimate the market value of the destroyed crop, along with the costs of fixing the damage to the field. The owner, however, never personally stated that the value was $2,000 or any other figure over $1,000. The defendant moved to strike the charge because there was insufficient evidence to prove that the damage was greater than $1,000. The judge denied the motion and found the defendant guilty.

The defendant appealed, and in Crowder v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 658, 588 S.E.2d 384 (2003), the court of appeals threw out the verdict. The defendant argued that there was no direct evidence of the value of the crops, only the prosecutor’s statements as to that amount. The prosecutor argued that his statements gave context to the owner’s answer and that it was also implicit the owner agreed regarding the amount of damage.

The supreme court noted that a lay person may give an opinion regarding the value of property but that the owner never gave such an opinion at trial. As to the prosecutor’s statements, the court succinctly stated that counsel may not testify and that indictments are not evidence. The court understood that the owner may have implicitly agreed with the figure, but the court held that such an inference was too attenuated and that “[p]roperly used . . . an inference may extend a syllogism–not begin one.” 41 Va. App at 665, 588 S.E.2d at 388. The court held that given the evidence no reasonable factfinder could conclude the defendant had destroyed more than $1,000 of property and reversed the trial court but remanded the case for retrial for the lesser included offense of misdemeanor destruction of prop erty.

How About Spero Agnew? Or Heath Barr? Better Yet, Jane Doe

In Spero v. Heath, No. 030495, 2004 WL 434327 (Va., Mar. 5, 2004), the natural father David Heath petitioned the circuit court to change the name of his child from Ella Spero to E lla Heath. The natural mother Jessica Spero objected. Heath and Spero were never married and apparently never compatible (except in the physical sense, obviously).

Heath alleged that Spero had been convicted of DUI within one year of the child’s birth. Spero claimed that Heath was a drug dealer who provided no support for the child. She also claimed that H eath was planning to move to Amsterdam, which raises the question of why a drug dealer would move to a place where many drugs are legal? In any event, the circuit court held that it would be in the best interest of the child to change her surname to Heath, and the mother appealed.

The supreme court noted that Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-17 requires a petitioner seeking the name change to petition for a hearing to determine if it is in the minor’s best interest. Thus, the petitioner bears the burden of proof. He may show the change is in the minor’s best interest by proving (1) the parent sharing the surname has abandoned his or her natural ties with the child, (2) the parent sharing the surname has engaged in misconduct embarrassing the minor in the continued use of the name (Lewinsky, maybe?), (3) the minor will otherwise suffer substantial detriment by bearing the surname, or (4) the minor is of sufficient age and discretion to make an intelligent choice and desires such a change.

The court also noted that although the older cases had used gender-specific terms in delineating the above factors, that did not mean there is any presumption a child should always bear a father’s surname or that the mother always bears the burden of proof.

Given the above and the evidence adduced at trial, the court held that the natural father had failed to present sufficient evidence that making his daughter a Heath was in her best interest. The DUI was considered insufficient to embarrass the minor, and there were no other factors present showing that the minor would suffer from being a Spero. Maybe back in 1973 such a surname would have been embarrassing, but Mr. Agnew has been dead for almost a decade.